- An overview of the reset agenda from the Minister of Police and MINMEC by Cobus Steenkamp, lecturer and researcher in police practice and criminal justice at the North-West University (NWU).
On 25 July 2026, Acting Minister of Police Firoz Cachalia briefed the media following the second Police MINMEC meeting of the year in White River, Mpumalanga.
The minister announced that the Police Reset Agenda had been unanimously endorsed by the provincial MECs responsible for community safety and had moved “from proposal to implementation”. It seeks to restore professionalism, integrity and accountability within the South African Police Service (SAPS), while repositioning it as a modern, intelligence-led police service.
This commitment is welcome. What remains unclear is whether the agenda gives South Africans anything concrete against which to measure its implementation or hold government accountable.
What South Africans should have been given
A reform programme of this scale, particularly amid the troubling revelations before the Madlanga Commission of Inquiry, should have provided a detailed implementation timetable, clearly identified areas requiring intervention, provincial crime priorities and defined lines of responsibility.
South Africans should also have been told how the 140 police station precincts selected for the first phase were identified, what resources each will receive, how much implementation will cost and how progress will be measured.
Some of these matters have been partially addressed.
SAPS received R127,072 billion for the 2026/27 financial year, increasing to R135,8 billion by 2028/29. However, this is the budget for the entire police service and not a transparent account of what the Reset Agenda itself will cost.
The 140 “high-crime police stations” will reportedly receive operational support, enhanced oversight, additional resources, infrastructure upgrades and performance monitoring. Yet the stations were not named. The public was also not told precisely how they will be selected, what each will receive or when the interventions will be started.
This is especially puzzling because the SAPS Annual Performance Plan for 2026/27 already identifies a “Top 30 Plus 5” group of high-contact-crime stations earmarked for additional resources. The relationship between these stations and the 140 stations earmarked under the Reset Agenda, should be explained.
A plan that cannot be independently verified, audited and measured remains difficult to distinguish from an expression of political intent.
The missing “how”
One important element of the Reset Agenda is its intention to involve all three spheres of government. This is defensible because crime cannot be reduced through conventional policing alone.
However, service delivery weaknesses exist across government. These institutions do not necessarily possess the specialist knowledge required to understand SAPS’s structural mechanics, legal framework or accountability requirements.
Turning intergovernmental commitment into competence will require training, coordination and sustained investment. These will consume time and resources that should not simply be assumed to have been accounted for.
The agenda also emphasises gender-based violence, Crime Intelligence, leadership appointments, organised crime, gangsterism, corruption and reform of the private security industry. These are the correct priorities, but each requires a credible “how”.
Supply chain management has long been vulnerable to corruption within SAPS. The minister said procurement reforms were being accelerated with National Treasury, but provided little detail about the envisioned controls that will close existing loopholes.
What will change? Who will be responsible? By when must the reforms be implemented, and where will the public be able to inspect the results?
Frontline policing presents the same problem. This is where people experience police service delivery: at the Community Service Centre, while reporting gender-based violence, during an emergency or when waiting for officers who may lack a functioning vehicle.
Without published targets, South Africans cannot determine whether promised resources reached frontline policing or what difference they made.
How many additional officers, vehicles, detectives or forensic resources will each station receive, under the Reset Agenda? Will response times be measured? Will detective caseloads be reduced? Will docket quality and successful referrals for prosecution be monitored?
Unless these questions are answered, “improved resource allocation” can mean almost anything.
Credit where it is due
The announcement of the new permanent provincial commissioners, appointed in Mpumalanga, the Western Cape, North-West and Limpopo was positive. These positions stabilise command structures and provide clearer accountability.
The same urgency is needed at the top of SAPS. National Commissioner General Fannie Masemola was placed on precautionary suspension in April 2026, and Lieutenant General Puleng Dimpane was appointed Acting National Commissioner. The post is not formally vacant, but SAPS is operating without settled permanent leadership while undertaking significant reform.
Placing KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Commissioner Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi at the head of the National Organised Crime Strategy is also significant. An intelligence-led response to criminal syndicates operating across provincial boundaries is urgently needed. Nevertheless, strong leadership cannot compensate for undefined mandates and unpublished targets.
Judging the reset against Batho Pele
Community policing should reflect the Batho Pele principles of public service. Against several of these principles, the agenda remains incomplete.
Openness and transparency require government to identify the 140 stations, explain their selection and disclose how money will be spent. Value for money cannot be assessed without targets and expenditure figures. Redress is impossible without mechanisms for identifying failure, correcting course and applying consequences.
The minister has made a start, and some priorities are difficult to dispute. South Africa needs a professional, ethical and accountable police service. It needs effective Crime Intelligence, stable leadership, clean procurement and properly resourced police stations.
But a list of worthy priorities is not yet an implementation plan.
If the agenda has entered implementation, government should publish the 140 stations, their selection criteria, allocated resources, timetable, responsible officials and expected outcomes.
South Africans do not merely need to be told that SAPS will be reset. They need to be shown how, by whom, by when and at what cost.
